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Abstract:  In 2004, the Congress voted to end funding for a Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) data mining program called Total Information Awareness (TIA) that was 
supposed to be used for preventing terrorist attacks.  Because this was not the only data mining 
project established by the U.S. government after September 11, this paper examines the likely 
impact of the TIA cancellation on future efforts.  It summarizes the controversy over warrantless 
wiretaps in the more recent past and then turns to the broader question of the tradeoffs between 
privacy and security. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the greatest potential promises and threats of the information age is the ability to 
generate, store, transmit, and process huge amounts of data quickly and economically.  The 
promise consists mainly in accelerating the generation and diffusion of knowledge globally; the 
threat derives from the possibility that governments, corporations, and other institutions might 
use their control over information for oppressive purposes.  The concept of surveillance – the 
monitoring or close observation of behavior from above – is frequently used in works warning of 
the dangers associated with the rapid spread of information and computing technologies (ICTs).1   
 
Surveillance, of course, was around before the information age.  During the Spanish Inquistion, 
for example, the Inquisitor General deployed agents to uncover and report on heretical activities.  
                                                            
1 See, for example, David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of the Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1994); William Bogard, The Simulation of Surveillance: Hyper Control in Telematic Societies 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life 
(Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001).  
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Louis XIV deployed a large network of spies to detect and arrest dissidents.   Inspector Javert, 
the fictional anti-revolutionary police officer of Les Miserables, was a notable practitioner of 
pre-electronic surveillance.  The totalitarian governments of the twentieth century employed the 
secret police to spy on the citizenry and to intimidate them in order to stifle dissent.  George 
Orwell in Nineteen Eight-Four envisioned a future in which “thought police” would be 
employed to uncover and punish “thoughtcrimes.” 
 
Michel Foucault’s interest in surveillance began with his research into techniques used to control 
prisoners in penitentiaries and mental patients in hospitals.  He uses Jeremy Bentham’s idea of 
the panopticon (a sort of ideal prison) as a starting point for his theories.  Foucault generalized 
the concept of surveillance as an essential element of power, and extended it to “self-
surveillance” – the internalization of social norms and values that enables authority to be 
exercised invisibly.2  Followers of Foucault, like Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Paul Virilio, 
David Lyon, and Bill Bogard, later created a school of thought called surveillance studies.3 
 
An example that is frequently mentioned by critics of the contemporary trend toward electronic 
surveillance is the national network of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras set up by the 
British government as a crime-fighting and terrorism-prevention measure.  As of 2002, it was 
estimated that there were 500,000 CCTV cameras in London, or about one for every 14 
inhabitants.4 
 
In a popular Hollywood film, Enemy of the State (1998), Robert Clayton Dean, the character 
played by Will Smith, is tracked in real time by video cameras, satellite imaging, telephone 
wiretaps, bugging devices, and database searches.  While this film clearly exaggerated the 
surveillance capabilities of the U.S. government of the time, it is also clear that many people in 
the military and in law enforcement dreamt about a future in which all this was possible. 
 
After September 11, 2001, members of the military and law enforcement agencies saw an 
opportunity to realize their dreams as the country reorganized itself around the shared goal of 
preventing future terrorist attacks.  The USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 represented a major restructuring of the U.S. government.  The Patriot Act expanded the 
powers of existing U.S. law enforcement agencies for the stated purpose of fighting terrorism, 
while the Homeland Security Act created a new cabinet-level agency, the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
 
                                                            
2 Michel Foucault, Surveillir et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). 
3 For more information see the web site for the Surveillance Studies Network at http://www.surveillance-
studies.net/. 
4 Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, “ CCTV in London,” Working Paper No. 6  in On the Threshold to Urban 
Panopticon?  Analyzing the Employment of CCTV in European Cities and Assessing its Social and Political 
Impacts, June 2002, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf. 
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The 9/11 Commission noted that there were a number of major intelligence failures that if 
avoided might have made it possible to prevent the attacks.  The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) had records of the hijackers’ entry into the country, some of whom had used their 
true names.  The airline companies had some of the names on their reservation logs.  Two of the 
hijackers’ names were on a terrorist watch list.  The Commission criticized the intelligence 
agencies and particularly the FBI and CIA for failing to share critical information, perhaps 
because of the fear of violating the Insurrection Act of 1807 that limited the role of the federal 
government in dealing with domestic violence and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that limited 
the use of the armed forces for domestic law enforcement.  The Commission called for the 
appointment of a Director of National Intelligence to coordinate all the intelligence activities in 
the U.S. government, the establishment of a National Counterterrrorism Center, and a new 
commitment to share counterterrorism information across agencies.5 
 
One of the results of the soul searching that followed the September 11 attacks was a new 
willingness to beef up the capabilities of the intelligence agencies and the new Department of 
Homeland Security to detect and apprehend potential terrorists inside the United States.  One of 
the technologies thought to be available to help in doing this was data mining. 
 
Definition of Data Mining 
Data mining is the “use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and 
relationships in large data sets.”6  Data mining is one step in a broader “knowledge discovery” 
process.  Data mining technologies employ advanced computers and computer software to 
identify patterns that are not easily discerned by other methods.  Data mining goes beyond data 
collection, access, and analysis by applying computer algorithms to detect patterns across linked 
data bases.  The distinction is clarified in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1. The Evolution of Data Mining 
 
Evolutionary 
Step 
Enabling 
Technologies 
Product 
Providers 
Characteristics 
Data Collection  
(1960s) 
Computers, tapes, 
disks 
IBM, CDC Retrospective, 
static data 
delivery 
Data Access  Relational databases 
(RDBMS), 
Oracle, 
Sybase, 
Retrospective, 
dynamic data 
                                                            
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive 
Summary, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm. 
6 Jeffrey Seifert, Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, updated January 18, 2007), p. 1. 
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(1980s) 
Structured Query 
Language (SQL), 
ODBC 
Informix, 
IBM, 
Microsoft 
delivery at 
record level 
Data 
Warehousing &  
Decision 
Support 
(1990s) 
On-line analytic 
processing (OLAP), 
multidimensional 
databases, data 
warehouses 
Pilot, 
Comshare, 
Arbor, 
Cognos, 
Microstrategy 
Retrospective, 
dynamic data 
delivery at 
multiple levels 
Data Mining  
(Emerging 
Today) 
Advanced 
algorithms, 
multiprocessor 
computers, massive 
databases 
Pilot, 
Lockheed, 
IBM, SGI, 
numerous 
startups 
(nascent 
industry) 
Prospective, 
proactive 
information 
delivery 
 
Source: Adapted from Kurt Thearling, “An Introduction to Data Mining,”                             
http://www.thearling.com/text/dmwhite/dmwhite.htm. 
 
ChoicePoint, LexisNexis, and Acxiom are three large and successful companies that sell access 
to multiple databases that are maintained in their data warehouses.  Table 2 provides a list of 
companies that sell data mining software and services. 
 
Table 2. A List of Data Mining Vendors 
 
Company Headquarters URL  
Business Objects San Jose, CA www.businessobjects.com 
Informatica Redwood City, CA www.informatica.com 
ProClarity Boise, ID www.proclarity.com 
Ascential Software Westboro, MA www.ascential.com 
Cognos Burlington, MA www.cognos.com 
Coremetrics San Mateo, CA www.coremetrics.com 
Hyperion Santa Clara, CA www.hyperion.com 
IBM San Jose, CA www.ibm.com 
Microstrategy McLean, VA www.microstrategy.com 
NCR Teradata Dayton, OH www.teradata.com 
SAS Cary, NC www.sas.com 
Clear Forest Waltham, MA www.clearforest.com 
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SPSS Chicago, IL www.spss.com 
Hummingbird Mountain View, CA www.hummingbird.com 
I-Impact Israel www.i-impact.com 
Source: http://www.data-mining-guide.net/Data-Mining-Vendors.html. 
 
Two of these companies, SAS and SPSS, are companies that also sell statistical analysis software 
frequently used in social scientific research. 
 
Commercial applications of data mining are many and various.  Amazon and Google use data 
mining to create focused advertisements based on a customer’s past purchases or searches. Credit 
card companies use data mining to spot potential identity thefts.7  Non Obvious Relationship 
Awareness (NORA) software developed by a company called Systems Research and 
Development (SRD) is used in Las Vegas to prevent fraud, cheating and theft in gambling 
casinos.  
 
Before September 11, U.S. government agencies began to use data mining for a variety of 
purposes.  For example, from the early 1990s on, the U.S. Department of the Treasury had used 
data mining to detect money laundering operations through its Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN). 8 
 
Able Danger 
U.S. government data mining efforts for counterterrorism began well before September 11.  In 
October 1999, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) to create a classified anti-terrorism program called Able 
Danger.  Able Danger experimented with data mining of both classified and open source 
information to identify potential terrorists and terrorist operations.  It targeted Al Qaeda 
specifically -- because of the attacks in New York (the first attack on the World Trade Towers), 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen (on the USS Cole) – but it targeted also the paramilitary forces that 
U.S. troops were encountering in Bosnia.  According to Patience Wait: 
 
For instance, as the Army prepared troops for deployment to Bosnia, “we were asked 
what the troops will see,” the source said. “We mined information on the [Bosnian] 
paramilitary, on organized crime, the condition of the infrastructure, etc. And we 
started to see linkages.”  
 
Able Danger researched small arms manufacturers in the region, and determined that 
American soldiers could figure out alliances by identifying which paramilitary forces 
or gangsters carried whose guns. It purchased photos from paparazzi in Paris that 
                                                            
7 Markle Foundation, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security, December 2003, 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/Report2_Full_Report.pdf. 
8 Mary DeRosa, Data Mining and Analysis for Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, March 2004), pp. 4-5. 
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showed crime figures out on the town, and who they were out with, shedding light on 
relationships between different factions.9 
 
A major defender of Able Danger in Congress was Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA).  
Weldon testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005, that Department 
of Defense lawyers had ordered the data collected for Able Danger to be destroyed.  An 
enormous amount of data had been collected from both classified intelligence sources and 
commercial data vendors.  When erased in the summer of 2000, there were 2.5 terabytes of 
information in the data warehouse created by the program. 
 
Able Danger reappeared as a controversy during and after the 9/11 Commission.  Former 
employees argued that they had identified at least one of the September 11 hijackers, 
Mohammed Atta, a year before the attack and again in a chart presented to the Deputy National 
Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, immediately after the attack.  The Department of Defense 
ordered a number of these former employees not to testify at the September 21, 2005, hearings 
mentioned above. 10    
 
Total Information Awareness 
In January 2002, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the 
Information Awareness Office (IAO) to bring together a variety of DARPA-funded projects that 
applied information technology to countering transnational threats to national security.  Led by 
Admiral John Poindexter, the IAO started work on an experimental program called Total 
Information Awareness (TIA).  Under Secretary of Defense Peter Aldredge explained the TIA 
program in a press briefing on November 2002 as follows: 
 
The war on terror and the tracking of potential terrorists and terrorist acts require that 
we search for clues of such activities in a mass of data. It's kind of a signal-to-noise 
ratio. What are they doing in all these things that are going on around the world? 
And we decided that new capabilities and new technologies are required to 
accomplish that task. Therefore, we established a project within DARPA, the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, that would develop an experimental 
prototype -- underline, experimental prototype, which we call the Total Information 
Awareness System. The purpose of TIA would be to determine the feasibility of 
searching vast quantities of data to determine links and patterns indicative of terrorist 
activities. 
 
There are three parts to the TIA project to aid in this anti-terrorist effort. The first 
part is technologies that would permit rapid language translation, such as you -- as 
                                                            
9 Patience Wait, “Data-mining offensive in the works,” Government Computer News (October 10, 2005), 
http://www.gcn.com/print/24_30/37242-1.html. 
10 Wait; Louis Freeh, “An Incomplete Investigation: Why Did the 9/11 Commision Ignore “Able Danger”?” Wall 
Street Journal (November 17, 2005), http://opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559. 
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we have used on the computers now, we can -- there's voice recognition capabilities 
that exist on existing computers. 
 
The second part was discovery of connections between transactions -- such as 
passports; visas; work permits; driver's license; credit card; airline tickets; rental 
cars; gun purchases; chemical purchases – and events -- such as arrest or suspicious 
activities and so forth. So again, it try [sic] to discover the connections between these 
things called transactions. 
 
And the third part was a collaborative reasoning-and-decision- making tools to allow 
interagency communications and analysis. In other words, what kind of decision 
tools would permit the analysts to work together in an interagency community? 
 
The experiment will be demonstrated using test data fabricated to resemble real-life 
events. We'll not use detailed information that is real. In order to preserve the 
sanctity of individual privacy, we're designing this system to ensure complete 
anonymity of uninvolved citizens, thus focusing the efforts of law enforcement 
officials on terrorist investigations. The information gathered would then be subject 
to the same legal projections (sic) currently in place for the other law enforcement 
activities.11 
 
The TIA program was embroiled in controversy from the start.  The choice of Admiral 
Poindexter, who had been convicted for his participation in the Iran-Contra scandal (the 
conviction was subsequently overturned), to head the IAO made critics particularly uneasy.  John 
Markoff published the first news story on the program in the New York Times on February 13, 
2002.12   Civil libertarians immediately expressed concern about potential violations of civil 
liberties.  The American Civil Liberties Union joined forces with the conservative Eagle Forum.  
The Heritage Foundation and the Assocation for Computing Machinery also opposed the TIA.13  
On November 14, 2002, William Safire wrote a strongly critical editorial on the op-ed pages of 
the New York Times.  Safire claimed that all U.S. citizens would be under surveillance if the 
program continued.14 
 
Senator Russ Feingold (D-MN) introduced legislation on January 16, 2003, to suspend the TIA 
program.  Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Jon Corzine (D-NJ) were co-sponsors of similar 
legislation.  In February 2003, Congress passed a bill suspending the actitivies of the IAO 
                                                            
11 “Transcript of Pentagon Briefing on Poindexter’s TIA Program,” http://www.politechbot.com/p-04186.html. 
12 John Markoff, “Chief Takes Over at Agency to Thwart Attacks on U.S.” New York Times (February 13, 2002), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E0D61F3CF930A25751C0A9649C8B63. 
13 Julia Scheeres, “Bush Data-Mining Plan in Hot Seat,” Wired News, February 6, 2003, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/02/57568 
14 William Safire, “You are Suspect,” New York Times, November 14, 2002, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE6D71630F937A25752C1A9649C8B63. 
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pending a report to Congress on the office’s activities.  On May 20, 2003, DARPA provided 
such a report,  changing the name of TIA to the Terrorism Information Awareness program, 
attempting to reassure critics that it did not involve actual surveillance but was simply testing 
new technologies that might be used to detect terrorists in the future.  Critics of the program were 
not reassured, Poindexter resigned, and the TIA program budget was zeroed out in the Defense 
Appropriations Act of 2004.15   
 
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) 
In 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided a grant to Northwest Airlines to 
create a prototype system to screen airline passengers who might be hijackers.  The result was 
the Computer-Assisted Prescreening System (CAPS or CAPPS I).  Other airline adopted the 
system voluntarily, but in 1999 the FAA issued a rule mandating the use of CAPS for all U.S. 
flights.  After September 11, the Transportation Safety Administration in the Department of 
Homeland Security began work on a Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
(CAPPS II), to improve the screening of passengers.  CAPPS II would color code all passengers 
as either green, yellow, or red.  Green passengers would receive normal screening, yellow 
passengers would receive additional screening, red passengers would not be allowed to fly.  The 
basic idea was to combine information provided by passengers voluntarily to the airlines with 
commercially available data on individuals and then apply data mining algorithms as a check on 
passenger identities.  The TSA promised not to view directly or to store for long periods the 
information on individuals in its CAPPS II data warehouses. 
 
Delta Airlines began testing CAPPS II in 2003.  A consumer boycott quickly was mounted by 
consumer concerned about privacy.  In September 2003, a news report revealed that JetBlue 
shared private passenger information with the Torch Concepts, a defense contractor, in 
September 2002, during a test of another data mining project.  In January 2004, another news 
story revealed that Northwest had shared passenger data with the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration in 2001 for yet another data mining project.  The Senate Committee on 
Government Affairs held a confirmation hearing in June 2004 at which the acting director of the 
TSA, David Stone, revealed that four airlines and two travel reservations companies had 
provided passenger data voluntarily to TSA and/or its contractors. 
 
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge announced the dismantling of the program in July 
2004.  Critics in Congress focused on privacy concerns.  They were supported by a variety of 
civil liberties groups.  Ridge said that a new program in which travelers could “register” 
voluntarily would replace CAPPS II.16  In August 2004, TSA announced officially the 
cancellation of CAPPS II and its replacement with a new system called Secure Flight.  In early 
2006, after spending more than $100 million on the project, TSA announced the cancellation of 
Secure Flight because it could not deal with the privacy concerns raised by Congress and civil 
liberties advocates.  
                                                            
15 “Information Awareness Office,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office. 
16 Mimi Hall and Barbara DeLollis, “Plan to Collect Flier Data Canceled,” USA Today, July 14, 2004, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-07-14-fly-plan_x.htm. 
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Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) 
MATRIX was developed by a Florida-based private company, Seisint, in conjuction with the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to facilitate collaborative information sharing 
for counterterrorism.  Some of the initial funding came from the Department of Homeland 
Security.  MATRIX generated High Terrorist Factor (HTF) scores for individuals based on age, 
gender, driver safety records, proximity to “dirty” telephone numbers, credit bureau history, and 
ethnicity (among others).  Seisint created a list of 120,000 names of individuals with high HTF 
scores and provided the list to the FBI, the INS, the Secret Service, and the FDLE. 
 
The analytical core of the MATRIX project was an application called Factual Analysis Criminal 
Threat Solution (FACTS) that amalgamated state and public records on individuals.  FACTS 
included, among other items, FAA pilot licenses and aircraft ownership records, property 
ownership records, information on vessels registered with the Coast Guard, state sexual offender 
lists, federal terrorist watch lists, bankrupty filings, etc.   
 
Beginning in the early 1980s, a Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), with data 
accessible via a secured intranet called RISSNET, permitted a large number of state-level 
agencies to share law inforcement information.  After the MATRIX project created FACTS, 
FACTS data were made available to state agencies that subscribed to the service via RISSNET. 
 
Like TIA and CAPPS II, MATRIX came under withering criticism from civil libertarians.  A 
number of states that had utilitized the FACTS data decided to opt out; some refused to 
participate from the outset.   Federal funding of MATRIX ended in 2005 and the project was 
discontinued.17 
 
Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 
The Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is an Internet-based system that 
collects, manages, and distributes information about exchange students and foreign visitors 
during their stays in the United States.  It is administered by the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homeland Security.   
 
The system was first initiated in July 2001 and expanded in January 2003 to include air flight 
schools, language training schools, and vocational schools, in addition to colleges and 
universities.  The program is funded largely by fees charged to foreign students and visitors 
included in the SEVIS data base.18 
 
Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
                                                            
17 Seifert, pp. 12-16.  See also Stephen E. Fienberg, “Privacy and Confidentiality in an e-Commerce World: Data 
Mining, Data Warehousing, Matching and Disclosure Limitation,” Statistical Science, Vol. 21 (2006), pp. 143-154. 
18 Shannon R. Anderson, “Total Information Awareness and Beyond: The Dangeers of Using Data Mining 
Technology to Prevent Terrorism,” Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Northhampton, Mass., July 2004, p. 7.  
Available at http://www.bordc.org/threats/data-mining.pdf. 
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The Customs and Border Protection office of the Department of Homeland Security developed 
the Automated Targeting System (ATS) for “targeting, identifying, and preventing potential 
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.”19  ATS receives data in real 
time from the Automated Commercial System (ACS), the Automated Export System (AES), the 
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), and the Treasury Enforcement Communication 
System (TECS).  It collects data directly from commercial carriers in the form of a Passenger 
Name Record (PNE).  ATS looks at inbound and outbound cargo and passengers, and private 
vehicles arriving by land.20 
 
The above is just a sampling of the universe of U.S. government counterterrorist data mining 
efforts.  Table 3  provides a listing of data mining programs, including others not described 
above, that may also be incomplete. 
 
Table 3. List of U.S. Federal Government Counterterrorist Data Collection and Mining 
Programs 
 
Name Administered 
by 
Period of 
Operation 
Scope of Operation Types of Data 
Able Danger Defense, 
SOCOM 
1999-2000 Al Qaeda and Bosnia Classified and 
commercial 
TIA Defense, 
DARPA 
2002-2004 Research on new 
counterterrorism data 
mining techniques 
Classified and 
commercial 
CAPPS II Homeland 
Security 
2001-2004 Preventing hijacking 
and airline-based 
terrorism 
Airline passenger 
personal 
information 
MATRIX Consortium 
of States 
2001-2005 Targeting of potential 
criminals and 
terrorists 
State public records 
and law 
enforcement data 
SEVIS Homeland 
Security 
2001-present Detecting terrorists in 
colleges, universities, 
and schools 
Data on exchange 
students and foreign 
visitors 
                                                            
19 Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Automated Targeting System, November 2, 
2006, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_ats.pdf, p. 2. 
20 Ibid, p. 2-8. 
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ATS Homeland 
Security 
Late 1990s 
to present, 
Expanded in 
2001 
Preventing terrorists 
and terrorist weapons 
from entering the US 
Passenger and cargo 
data, especially, but 
also other data 
US-VISIT Homeland 
Security 
2004-present Tracking entrants to 
US 
Photograph and 
finger-print data 
Project 
Strikeback 
FBI, 
Education 
2001-2006 Tracking college aid 
money to potential 
terrorists 
Financial aid 
records of 
individuals 
 
It is worth noting that most of the data mining programs in Table 3 had been discontinued by 
2005.  The main criticisms of counterterrorist data mining were: 
 
• Inability of the programs to meet their technical goals because of poor data, faulty 
algorithms, interoperability problems, and the generation of too many “false positives” 
• Inability of the programs to adequately address privacy concerns 
• The non-transparent combination of classified and open-source data in some programs 
• The general lack of transparency in most of the programs 
• The potential for other forms of abuse besides privacy violations, or “mission creep” (the 
use of data for purposes other than those originally stated).21 
 
After 2005, controversies over warrantless searches displaced, to some degree, the ongoing 
debate about data mining.  The main link between the controversies over data mining and 
warrantless searches is a shared concern about the tradeoffs between security and privacy. 
  
Warrantless Wiretaps 
Even before the death of the TIA, the Bush administration had pushed for giving the National 
Security Agency (NSA) a greater role in domestic surveillance.  For many years, the various law 
enforcement agencies had been advocating an updating of the laws governing wiretaps to permit 
new forms of surveillance appropriate to the electronic age.  NSA had already begun to ask 
telecommunications companies like AT&T to provide access to their central office switches so 
that the NSA could collect data on telephone calls and Internet usage.  The Communications for 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 mandated that telecommunications carriers design their 
equipment to permit surveillance by law enforcement agencies.  In short, the carriers had to 
create “back doors” to their digital switches to facilitate government investigations.   
 
An AT&T employee in San Francisco named Mark Klein blew the whistle on a San Francisco 
operation involving the NSA in 2005.  Klein claimed that the NSA was basically copying and 
archiving all the data passing through the San Francisco switching station.  Klein’s information 
led to the filing in 2006 of a major class-action law suit, Hepting v. AT&T, that charged AT&T 
                                                            
21 Seifert; Fienberg; Anderson; more to be added. 
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was illegally permitting and assisting the government to unlawfully monitor the communications 
of a large part of the US population.22 
 
In February 2003, the Department of Justice drew up plans for a new law, the Domestic Security 
Enhancement Act (DSEA), that would expand the ability of law enforcement agencies to gather 
data from the Internet and other sources.  Attorney General John Ashcroft believed that the 
existing law governing the gathering of intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) of 1978 was not well suited to the task of gathering intelligence on the activities of 
terrorists, particularly those operating within the territory of the United States.23  The DSEA, also 
called Patriot Act II or Son of Patriot, would have permitted searches and surveillance without 
warrants or court orders.  It also called for the creation of DNA data bases of suspected terrorists, 
immunity from civil liability for individuals and firms providing private information to the 
government, expansion of the list of crimes eligible for the death penalty, criminalization of the 
use of encryption technologies for protecting “incriminating communications,” and the 
revocation of citizenship and deportation of U.S. citizens who support terrorists.24  After the draft 
of the bill was leaked to the press, strong opposition from civil libertarians led the administration 
to search for other methods to achieve their aims. 
 
In March 2004, Vice President Richard Cheney asked White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez 
and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card to visit the hospital bed of Attorney General John 
Ashcroft who was recovering from gall bladder surgery to authorize the renewal of a secret 
surveillance program for the NSA that had been created soon after the September 11 attacks.  
The program permitted the NSA to monitor phone calls and e-mails between the United States 
and foreign countries without warrants.  When he got wind of this visit, acting Attorney General 
James Comey rushed to the hospital to convince Ashcroft that he should not sign off.  Lawyers at 
the Department of Justice had reviewed and questioned the legality of the program. Comey 
threatened to resign.  FBI Director Robert Mueller was also opposed and threatened to resign.25  
As a result, President Bush intervened and the program was restructured to be consistent with the 
requirements of FISA. 
 
This was not the end of warrantless searches, however.   On May 11, 2006, an article published 
in USA Today reported that the NSA “had been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens 
                                                            
22 Ellen Nakashima, “A Story of Surveillance: Former Technician ‘Turning In’ AT&T over NSA Program,” 
Washington Post, November 7, 2007, p. D1.  See http://www.eff.org/cases/hepting for the full text of the complaint 
and further documentation. 
23 FISA permitted a variety of surveillance techniques other than traditional phone wiretaps and bugging.  For 
example, there was a section of FISA that permitted electronic surveillance, keystroke logging of computers, and the 
installation of spyware.  All of these required warrants from the specially created FISA courts, however, but 
Ashcroft and other members of the Bush administration found this to be too cumbersome. 
24 For the full text of the proposed legislation, see http://www.loyalnine.com/DSEA2003_text_Patriot_Act_2. 
25 Dan Eggen, “Official: Cheney Urged Wiretaps,” Washington Post, June 7, 2007, p. A3. 
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of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth.”26  In June 
2006, the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal reported that the CIA 
and the Treasury Department had gained access to financial records from a vast international 
database housed at the Society for Worldwide Interback Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
in Belgium.27   
 
The story about the NSA resulted in the filing of over forty lawsuits against the government and 
the telecommunications agencies claiming violations of various privacy protection laws 
including the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).28   
 
The story about SWIFT resulted in a ruling by the Belgian government in September 2006 that 
SWIFT had violated both Belgian and European privacy laws by sharing data on cross-border 
wire transfers with the US government.  The Belgian ruling was upheld by an EU committee, 
with the result that European authorities asked the U.S. government to cease and desist.  U.S.-
European and intra-European discussions were held.  In November 2006, the Wall Street Journal 
quoted the negotiators as follows: 
U.S. diplomatic and law-enforcement officials have been meeting with their EU 
counterparts recently, including an unannounced meeting in Washington between 
Treasury Department officials and the EU's commissioner for justice, freedom and 
security, Franco Frattini, people familiar with the contacts said. Mr. Frattini is also 
vice president of the EU's executive body, the European Commission. 
 
"We have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue at senior levels with our EU 
counterparts, including with Vice President Frattini," said Treasury Undersecretary 
Stuart Levey. "This dialogue has focused on the value of the [financial intelligence 
program] in fighting terrorism globally, including its value to counterterrorism 
efforts in Europe. We have also discussed in detail the rigorous safeguards in place 
to protect the privacy of all citizens not engaged in terrorism."29 
 
The Debate over the Renewal of the Protect America Act 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 stipulates that all searches for the 
purpose of collecting foreign intelligence within the territory of the United States require a 
warrant from a secret FISA court.  Between 1979 and 2006, a total of 22,900 applications for 
warrants were made to the court and 22,895 of them were approved.  Yet, the Bush 
                                                            
26 Leslie Cauley, “NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls,” USA Today, May 11, 2006, p. A1. 
27 Josh Meyer and Greg Miller, “Secret U.S. Program Tracks Global Bank Transfers,” LA Times, June 23, 2006, 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0623-06.htm; Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Sifted in 
Secret by U.S. to Block Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006, p. A1. 
28 Randy Gainer, “Lawsuits Challenge the NSA’s Warrantless Data Mining and Surveillance Program,” The Privacy 
and Data Security Law Journal, Vol. 1 (September 2006), pp. 897-908. 
29 Glenn R. Simpson, “U.S., EU Seek to Ease Banking Privacy Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2006. 
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administration claimed that FISA created too heavy a burden on the agencies charged with 
counterterrorism and that the government had a right to authorize warrantless searches under 
CALEA and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Against Terrorists resolution 
of 2001.  
 
FISA was amended with passage of the Protect America Act (PAA) of 2007 to permit 
warrantless surveillance of foreign intelligence targets “reasonably believed” to be outside the 
United States.  The PAA was due to expire on February 17, 2008, so the White House pressed 
Congress to renew it.  The Senate passed a version of the bill that President Bush found 
acceptable, because it included immunity from lawsuits for telecommunications companies that 
had participated with government surveillance in the past.  The House, in contrast, passed a 
version that did not include guarantees of immunity.  In addition, the House insisted that all 
searches for counterterrorism had to be conducted under FISA warrants, in this case a change 
from the original terms of the Protect America Act.  According to the President: 
 
… the House bill could reopen dangerous intelligence gaps by putting in place a 
cumbersome court approval process that would make it harder to collect intelligence 
on foreign terrorists. This is an approach that Congress explicitly rejected last August 
when bipartisan majorities in both houses passed the Protect America Act. And it is 
an approach the Senate rejected last month when it passed a new -- new legislation to 
extend and strengthen the Protect America Act by an overwhelming vote of 68 to 29. 
 
Second, the House bill fails to provide liability protection to companies believed to 
have assisted in protecting our nation after the 9/11 attacks. Instead, the House bill 
would make matters even worse by allowing litigation to continue for years. In fact, 
House leaders simply adopted the position that class action trial lawyers are taking in 
the multi-billion-dollar lawsuits they have filed. This litigation would undermine the 
private sector's willingness to cooperate with the intelligence community, 
cooperation that is absolutely essential to protecting our country from harm. This 
litigation would require the disclosure of state secrets that could lead to the public 
release of highly classified information that our enemies could use against us. And 
this litigation would be unfair, because any companies that assisted us after 9/11 
were assured by our government that their cooperation was legal and necessary.30 
 
The defenders of the President’s position argue primarily on the basis of the need for speed in 
catching terrorists and the need for cooperation from private firms.  Critics argue that speed is 
not compromised by the existing FISA laws and that private firms should not have carte blanche 
to ignore the laws of the land in their dealings with the federal government.   
 
The Tradeoffs between Privacy and Security 
                                                            
30 “President Bush Discusses FISA,” White House Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, March 13m 2008, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080313.html. 
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To summarize, in the controversies over data mining and warrantless search since September 11 
the two contesting worldviews stress, on the one side, security, on the other, privacy.  The 
question raised by all this is to what extent legal privacy protections necessarily impair national 
security.   
 
The extreme view in favor of privacy is that legal protection of individual rights and liberties 
could be undermined in a blind pursuit of total security, especially if that involves ambitious 
electronic surveillance that leaves very little room for government transparency and individual 
privacy rights.   
 
The extreme view in favor of security is that rights and liberties will not be available to citizens 
if terrorists triumph, so whatever is needed to combat terrrorism is justified.  The extreme 
advocates of security argue that the government can be trusted not to abuse the power that comes 
with the collection of highly detailed counterterrorist information. 
 
Most of us are somewhere between these two extremes.  The balance in the Bush administration 
since 2001 has been weighted heavily toward the security extreme (but it should be noted that 
individuals in the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the Department of Justice, for example, 
have weighed in from time to time in favor of privacy guarantees at the expense of some 
counterterrorism programs).  One helpful approach suggested by technologists is to modify the 
technologies used for data mining and electronic surveillance so that they incorporate methods 
for protecting individual privacy.   
 
It is unlikely that a permanent bargain will be struck between the political forces involved in 
these controversies.  Nevertheless, there could be agreement on some of the goals for 
counterterrorist programs so that security could be enhanced in an incremental fashion without 
unduly threatening the rights of citizens.  For example, the Total Information Awareness 
program, for all its faults, included some excellent ideas for creating rapid translation 
technologies and for building in privacy guarantees into data mining technologies.  These 
programs were cut when the TIA was dismantled.  Similarly, it is possible for different 
government agencies to share data electronically in an interoperable manner that is actually 
needed for counterterrorist operations but does not violate the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. 
 
In conclusion, this paper shows how the efforts of the federal government after September 11, 
2001, to implement counterterrorist data mining programs and to update electronic surveillance 
methods and techniques began a national debate about the tradeoffs between privacy and 
security.  Such a debate would have occurred even in the absence of a precipitating event like 
September 11.   The debate is our opportunity to address some of the problems that can occur 
when enormous amounts of information can be created, stored, transmitted, and processed easily 
and cheaply, including information about individual human beings.  We need to rethink the rules 
governing the ownership and control over information and informational flows in light of the 
current debate.   
 
